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Economic development incentives—state and local
government efforts to encourage economic devel-
opment—are one of a limited number of tools local
policymakers have for stimulating local economies.
Some broad measures—investments in infrastructure
(such as transportation), human capital (education,
for example), and social infrastructure (such as recre-
ational facilities)—may produce signiﬁcant results
over the long term. Targeted measures crafted to
attract or retain businesses—usually a tax preference
or ﬁnancial assistance—offer the possibility of a
quick payoff.
Public interest in incentives has generally been
muted, except when very generous incentive pack-
ages, egregious practices, or legal issues have
prompted questions about their appropriateness and
effectiveness. Policymakers struggling with practical
decisions have frequently turned to economists for
guidance: Should incentives be offered? If so, how
large should they be? And how can an incentive
program be designed to increase its effectiveness?
Much of the research assessing the effectiveness of
incentives has been inconclusive or unsatisfactory, in
part because of methodological ﬂaws and inadequate
data.
Interest in incentives surged in the 1980s and
1990s as a result of very public bidding wars among
localities to entice businesses to their communities. In
particular, the dollar amount of incentive packages
offered to automobile manufacturers looking to locate
new facilities soared during that period. In 1980,
Nissan received an estimated $33 million, or $8,000
per anticipated job, for locating a new facility in
Tennessee. The amount of subsequent incentive pack-
ages handed out to Mazda, Saturn, DiamondStar, and
Toyota, among others, rose over the next few years,
and by 1987, Toyota was receiving an estimated
$150 million, or $50,000 per anticipated job, for
locating a new facility in Kentucky.1 And the incen-
tive packages were growing again before long. Al-
though BMW’s 1992 package to locate in South
Carolina was reportedly just $150 million, Mercedes-
Benz reportedly received $258 million the next year
to locate a facility in Alabama.2
News accounts of ever-larger incentive packages
caught the attention of economists and policymakers
as well as the public. An essay entitled “Congress
Should End the Economic War among the States”
appeared in the 1994 Annual Report of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.3 A few years later, a
conference on the same topic brought together policy-
makers, economists, tax experts, economic develop-
ers,andbusiness-sitelocationconsultantsfromaround
the country to discuss the matter.4 Many questions
were raised, and research goals were identiﬁed,
among them the goal of establishing good data with
which to answer the economic questions.
In the past ten years, case studies, input-output
analyses, and other research techniques have ad-
dressed some of the methodological ﬂaws of earlier
incentives studies. The availability of better data on
both incentives and economic activity has also im-
proved analyses of incentives research. The work
described in this article illustrates some of the fresh
ways that researchers have found to look at the
effectiveness of incentives. The focus is not on prov-
ing or disproving the effectiveness of incentives as a
1. Jeffrey A. Finkle (1996), “Location Incentives Are Unfair and
Poorly Justiﬁed,” pp. 1–2, www.developmentalliance.com/docu/pdf/
43300.pdf.
2. A detailed case study of the location of automobile assembly
plants can be found on the Good Jobs First website at
www.goodjobsﬁrst.org/corporate_subsidy/
automobile_assembly_plants.cfm.
3. Melvin L. Burstein and Arthur J. Rolnick (1994), “Congress
Should End the Economic War Among the States,” Essay in 1994
Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1994.cfm?js=0
4. The conference, held in Washington, D.C., on May 21–22, 1996,
was hosted by Minnesota Public Radio’s Civic Journalism Initiative.
For more information, see www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_
papers/studies/econwar/index.cfm and related links.
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October 2008means of spurring economic development. Rather, the
intent is to demonstrate that new ways are being used
to advance the discussion.
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM,
TEN YEARS AGO
In the 1990s, many academics and policymakers
expressed skepticism that state and local economic
development incentives could induce ﬁrms to add
jobs or invest in a particular locality. At the time,
researchers tended to conclude that incentives were
marginally effective at best. Such conclusions ap-
peared to corroborate the general notion that incen-
tives in the form of state and local tax breaks are
ineffective because state and local taxes typically
constitute a small portion of a business’s overall
costs. Furthermore, critics argued, if the incentives
increased the amount of income or proﬁt subject to
federal income tax, a considerable portion of the
amount saved through state and local tax relief would
likely be offset by higher federal taxes.
Much research during the 1980s and 1990s was
based on ﬂawed data or used independent variables
that did not accurately represent the dollar amount of
incentives. For example, several studies used the
number of incentive programs on a state’s books as a
proxy for the state’s total development effort. But
often this number does not provide a complete pic-
ture. Many states have on their books incentive
programs that are dormant, unfunded, or known to be
ineffective. And some states treat their incentives as
multiple programs, while others provide the same
beneﬁts within a single program.
Other early research on incentives used the budget
of a state’s lead development agency as a proxy for
development efforts. However, that amount is rarely
an accurate indicator of the amount spent directly on
incentives. For example, development agency funds
are typically used for other aspects of development,
such as marketing and staff payroll. Development
agency funds are also likely to be used for activities
not directly related to business development, such as
housing development or the promotion of tourism.
Moreover, funding for incentives may not come from
a development agency’s budget. If the incentive takes
the form of a tax preference, an appropriation may not
be necessary.And if an appropriation is necessary, the
funding for incentives may come from the budget of a
different agency, such as education or transportation.
Economic development data concerning the state
of Oklahoma, provided by the National Association
of State Development Agencies (NASDA), illustrate
the inadequacy of some data collection efforts.
According to NASDA, the state spent $20.45 million
on economic development in ﬁscal 1997. But this
amount was simply the budget for the Oklahoma
Department of Commerce, the state’s lead develop-
ment agency. The state’s single largest incentive that
year—worth just more than $1 billion—was a set of
sales tax exemptions available to all manufacturers
for purchasing machinery, equipment, and goods used
and consumed in manufacturing. An argument could
be made that these sales tax exemptions were not
truly incentives and, therefore, were appropriately not
included in the NASDA total because they were
nondiscretionary and fairly common among the states.
But there are other reasons to view the single NASDA
ﬁgure as inadequate. The most promoted incentive in
Oklahoma in ﬁscal 1997—a wage subsidy offered
under the state’s Quality Jobs program—cost the state
$21.1 million that year. But again, that amount was
not part of the Department of Commerce’s budget. A
second incentive, a local property tax abatement
costing $14.8 million in ﬁscal 1997, was a budget
item at the state level, as the state reimbursed local
governments providing the incentive; but this incen-
tive was also not in the department’s budget. A third
incentive in ﬁscal 1997—$13.2 million in tax credits
for investment and job creation—was a standard tax
preference, not an appropriated expenditure. Clearly,
the use of a narrowly focused budget ﬁgure as a proxy
for the state’s ﬁnancial commitment to its major
incentives, while seemingly logical, is problematic,
and it is unlikely to result in meaningful conclusions
as to the beneﬁts of the incentives.
THE SEARCH FOR A
BETTER RESEARCH DESIGN
The work of several researchers began to change the
conventional wisdom that business incentives were
marginally effective at best, as Fisher and Peters
noted in 1997.5 By conducting and identifying studies
that used more-detailed data and more-reﬁned tech-
niques, Newman and Sullivan compiled evidence of
the effectiveness of incentives.6 Bartik’s contribution
to incentives research was twofold: his comprehen-
sive literature review brought to light a substantial
body of work—released up through the early 1990s—
5. Peter S. Fisher and Alan H. Peters (1997), “Tax and Spending
Incentives and Enterprise Zones,” New England Economic Review
(March–April), pp. 109–130, www.bos.frb.org/economic/neer/
neer1997/neer297f.pdf.
6. Robert J. Newman and Dennis H. Sullivan (1988), “Econometric
Analysis of Business Tax Impacts on Industrial Location: What Do We
Know, and How Do We Know It?” Journal of Urban Economics,
vol. 23 (2), pp. 215–234.
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state and local development; furthermore, his system-
atic analysis of such variables as employment, home
prices, and wages in metropolitan areas illustrated the
effect on these variables of economic growth that may
result from incentives and other development efforts.7
Deﬁning Economic Development Incentives
Although research on incentives improved through
the 1990s, more clarity was needed to ensure that
studies were based on complete data. At the root of
the problem, as the Oklahoma example shows, was
the lack of a comprehensive deﬁnition for “economic
development incentives.” Fisher and Peters clariﬁed
the problem by identifying ﬁve categories of incen-
tives:8
1. one-time deals negotiated with individual ﬁrms,
2. grants and loans provided under programs that
receive annual state appropriations,
3. programs establishing parameters and limits but
allowing some degree of local government discre-
tion,
4. incentives that function as entitlements, whereby a
ﬁrm receives the beneﬁt automatically provided its
investment is in an eligible sector and the size of
the investment or number of new jobs created
exceeds some threshold, and
5. code features that apply to all ﬁrms, but beneﬁt
some more than others and are often advertised by
economic development agencies as reasons to
locate in a state.
To this list might be added changes to state statutes
that have the effect of opening markets to ﬁrms in
particularindustries.Examplesincludestatutechanges
to allow certain industries, such as corporate farming,
to begin or expand operations in a state; changes to
the apportionment formula for corporate income taxes
(to be discussed later); and relaxation of state usury
limits.9
Fisher and Peters noted that public interest in
economic development incentives tends to focus on
one-time deals (category 1).10 Much of the research
on incentives, however, has focused on tax-related
issues (categories 4 and 5), in part because identifying
special provisions in state tax codes, and then calcu-
lating effective tax burdens, is generally easier than
analyzing data for all the negotiated deals within a
speciﬁc geographic region or for a particular type of
program (assuming that all such data can even be
amassed). Yet when a study considers only tax incen-
tives offered by a state and ignores local or nontax
incentives, any conclusions will likely be faulty, as
research has shown that local and nontax incentives
can easily account for more than half the value of an
incentive package.
The following examples, based on actual state and
local incentives, illustrate the need to consider the
speciﬁcs of an incentive package. The ﬁrst case
involves property taxes, and the second, sales taxes.
￿ In one locality, a ﬁrm receives a property tax
abatement on a building (category 3); in a second
locality, a ﬁrm automatically qualiﬁes for a similar
abatement (category 4); and in a third locality, a
ﬁrm receives reduced rent in a building owned by
an industrial authority and not on the property tax
rolls (category 1). The reported value of these
commonly offered incentives may be the same, but
researchers using different deﬁnitions or having
incomplete information may reach very different
conclusions about the effectiveness of these prop-
erty tax incentives.
￿ One state has a sales tax provision that exempts, at
all times, all purchases by manufacturers of new
and used machinery and equipment; another state
exempts purchases of only new machinery and
equipment; a third state exempts purchases only
when a facility is built; and a fourth state limits the
exemption to certain geographic areas and to only
those ﬁrms that apply for it. Once again, analyses
that do not account for the differences among
incentive programs across jurisdictions may reach
different conclusions about the effectiveness of
those programs.
IMPROVING INCENTIVES RESEARCH:R EFINED
APPROACHES,B ETTER DATA SOURCES
Researchers have taken a number of approaches to
measuring the effectiveness of incentives. Economet-
7. Timothy Bartik (1991), “Who Beneﬁts from State and Local
Economic Development Policies?” Upjohn Institute.
8. Fisher and Peters, “Tax and Spending Incentives and Enterprise
Zones.”
9. Delaware and South Dakota, for example, relaxed their usury
limits in an effort to induce large banks to locate their credit card
operations within state borders—an effort that proved successful, as
evidenced by the cluster of large banks with high credit card volumes
located in Delaware and the South Dakota return address on many
credit card statements. For more information, see Steve Young (2002),
“Repealed Usury Law Helped Lure Industry,” Argus Leader, March
24; and Diane Ellis (1998), “The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate
Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-Offs, and the Personal
Bankruptcy Rate,” FDIC Bank Trends Series 98–05 (Washington,
D.C.: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, March), www.fdic.gov/
bank/analytical/bank/bt_9805.html.
10. Fisher and Peters, “Tax and Spending Incentives and Enterprise
Zones.”
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with weaknesses. Misspeciﬁcation of variables, for
example, can be a serious problem. Consider the
various property tax incentives in the ﬁrst of our prior
examples. A model looking at only tax-based incen-
tives will not capture the third type of property tax
incentive described, whereby the building is kept off
the property tax rolls altogether. Similarly, a model
that incorporates only state-level tax incentives may
be incomplete if local incentives constitute a large
portion of an incentive package (as might be the case
in the ﬁrst type of property tax incentive described
earlier). However, when the incentives studied are
carefully identiﬁed and the data used are known to
accurately represent the total incentive package,
econometric modeling can provide a reliable picture
of the effectiveness of incentives. Models are often
used in conjunction with other research approaches,
such as case studies and input-output analyses. In
addition, incentives studies using all of these ap-
proaches may tap national, state, or local data sets.
Case Studies: Varied Approaches to
Analyzing Incentives
Fisher and Peters created a hypothetical manufactur-
ing ﬁrm, and then used a case-study approach to look
at the effects of the incentives offered by enterprise
zones in more than 20 states and 100 cities.11 They
considered the details of the many incentive programs
they studied, speciﬁcally taking into account the type
and dollar amount of the incentives. This speciﬁcity
in deﬁning the study’s variables is notable. Fisher and
Peters found that such incentives cut the ﬁrm’s com-
bined state and local taxes, on average and as a
percentage of its new investment, by some 20 per-
cent. Nevertheless, they believed the effect was too
small to affect business-location decisions.
Using the actual example of General Motors, Bar-
tik looked at several competing incentive packages
and analyzed the beneﬁt to the automaker (in terms of
its estimated transportation, labor, and tax costs) of
locating its Saturn plant in Spring Hill, Tennessee.12
This actual case study is useful because it is limited to
a speciﬁc ﬁrm and a ﬁnite number of locations. In
another speciﬁc state case study, Loh considered the
incentives offered by different communities within
Ohio.13 Limiting her analysis to one state allowed
Loh to examine multiple categories of incentives
available to businesses. Bartik’s case study gauged
effectiveness by determining whether the presence of
an incentive made a particular location a better choice
for General Motors than competing locations. Look-
ing at effectiveness from a different perspective, Loh
measured effectiveness in terms of the effect (such as
employment growth or increased tax receipts), if any,
on local economies. For a variation on Loh’s ap-
proach, see the box “The Texas Local Economic
Development Sales Taxes,” which describes a case
study focusing on a homogeneous region.
Input-Output Analyses: Examining Linkages
Some recent studies employed input-output analyses
to examine how an incentive offered to a single large
ﬁrm can ripple through an economy, in turn affecting
such economic indicators as regional income and
employment. Alwang, Peterson, and Mills reported
on one such study, by the Virginia Economic Devel-
opmentPartnership,andthenconductedfurtheranaly-
sis.14 The initial study was conducted in compliance
with a Virginia requirement that a return-on-
investment analysis be undertaken whenever state
funds are to be used in an incentive package offered to
a single ﬁrm. Alwang, Peterson, and Mills explain
that they used Implan computer software to “examine
the linkages between the ﬁrm in question and its
suppliers, and expenditure patterns of people who
earn incomes from the ﬁrm.”15 Their further analysis
is signiﬁcant because they were able to identify both
the losers (such as ﬁrms that compete with the
business being recruited) and winners (such as suppli-
ers to the newly relocating ﬁrm and purchasers of its
output) resulting from the awarding of an incentive.
Dauffenbach and Warner also used Implan soft-
ware, in their case to develop a framework from
which to study two of Oklahoma’s largest state-level
development incentives: wage subsidies provided
under the “Quality Jobs” program and an exemption
from the ad valorem tax.16 They quantiﬁed the ﬁscal
11. Fisher and Peters, “Tax and Spending Incentives and Enterprise
Zones.” Enterprise zones are areas specially designated for develop-
ment for various reasons. Businesses locating in enterprise zones are
typically exempt from certain taxes and receive other economic
assistance.
12. Timothy Bartik (1991), “Who Beneﬁts from State and Local
Economic Development Policies?”
13. Eng Seng Loh (1993), “The Effects of Jobs-Targeted Develop-
ment Incentive Programs,” Growth and Change, vol. 24 (Summer),
pp. 365–83.
14. JeffreyAlwang, Everett B. Peterson, and Bradford Mills (2001),
“Assessing the Impacts of Incentives to Attract New Businesses: A
Case Study of the Scrap Recycling Industry” (October 23). Prelimi-
nary report available at dls.state.va.us/pubs/hjr157.pdf.
15. Alwang, Peterson, and Mills, “Assessing the Impacts of Incen-
tives to Attract New Businesses” p. 36.
16. Robert C. Dauffenbach and Larkin Warner (2004), “Oklaho-
ma’s Ad Valorem Tax Exemptions and the Quality Jobs Act: Analysis
of Economic Impacts and Tests for Differential Growth,” in Robert
Dauffenbach,Alexander Holmes, Ronald L. Moomaw, Kent W. Olson,
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results to determine the incentives’ effectiveness. For
the Quality Jobs program, they calculated a beneﬁt-
cost ratio of 6.60; in other words, each direct dollar of
incentive spending was associated with $6.60 of
increased tax revenue. They then examined state-
level employment data and found that industries that
received large shares of Quality Jobs payments grew
much faster than the national average for those indus-
tries.17 Using the same approach to look at the ad
valorem tax exemption, Dauffenbach and Warner
concluded that it is a drag on the state budget and
“fares poorly.”
In the Oklahoma example, input-output analysis
allowed Dauffenbach and Warner to estimate the
state’s rate of return on its investment in the two
development incentive programs. The data generated
by such an analysis can also be used to address the
“but-for” question: but for the presence of the wage
subsidies provided under the Quality Jobs program
and by the tax exemption, would the employment
gains have occurred? In other words, were these
incentives a factor in the decision to invest in Okla-
homa? Although it is a fundamental question in
incentives policy, researchers have had a very difficult
time answering the but-for question. No one has yet
been able to create a research design that randomly
assigns control and treatment groups. Still, Dauffen-
bach and Warner were able to quantify the economic
and ﬁscal effects of growth likely induced by an
incentive. Making the connection between incentives
and growth, though, is still an educated conjecture.
Data-Driven Analyses: Examining
Recently Available Data Sets
Many studies glean information from a local, state, or
national data set. These data sets are a relatively new
resource; many were unavailable to researchers until
the mid-1990s. The included Texas case study lists
local data from cities that did and did not adopt
special taxes in order to analyze the effectiveness of
the state’s economic development sales taxes. In
another study not explicitly considering incentives—
rather it served as an examination of the effects on
county employment—Edmiston used data on invest-
ments announced by ﬁrms adding at least 300 jobs at
new or existing facilities in Georgia.18 He corrobo-
rated the announcement data using state administra-
tive records. Edmiston found that existing business
expansions had a greater net effect on county employ-
ment than did the creation of new locations. This
ﬁnding suggests that recruited businesses can crowd
out local investment, resulting in smaller (though still
positive) beneﬁts for job growth.
Lee used a conﬁdential national data set, the Lon-
gitudinal Research Database (LRD) compiled by the
Census Bureau, which includes information from the
quinquennial Census of Manufacturing.19 This data-
base allowed Lee to look at the effects of the initial
locations and relocations of plants owned by manu-
facturing ﬁrms having multiple plants throughout the
United States. Lee concluded that, for the years 1972
through 1992, plants located in states that imple-
mented new incentive programs tended to increase
total employment, capital, and output only slightly
more than plants in other states.
Greenstone and Moretti drew on another national
database in order to look at the siting of new,
“million-dollar facilities” throughout the United
States.20 Using information from Site Selection maga-
zine on “winning” and “runner-up” counties, in com-
bination with other data, they were able to measure
the consequences of a county winning such a facility.
According to Greenstone and Moretti, winning coun-
ties had greater increases than corresponding
runner-up counties in property values, wages, and
local government revenues and expenditures in the
years following a location. They noted that the possi-
bility of winning a plant location invariably prompted
competitions between jurisdictions as they tried to
develop more-attractive tax packages for businesses.
New Tools and Resources: Providing Better
and More-Comprehensive Analysis
The 1996 “War Among the States” conference called
on state governments and other agencies to develop
better information on the costs and beneﬁts of eco-
and Larkin Warner, State Policy and Economic Development in
Oklahoma: 2004 (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma 21st Century, Inc.),
pp.13–27, www.okstatechamber.com/ﬁle_upload/OK21st2004.pdf.
17. Dauffenbach and Warner’s results are consistent with earlier
survey work by Gorin suggesting that about half of all jobs in the
Oklahoma program were induced by the presence of the incentive. See
Dan Gorin (2000), “State Economic Growth Incentives and the
Oklahoma Quality Jobs Program,” Oklahoma Policy Studies Review,
vol. 1, (Spring–Summer), pp. 7–12, www.libarts.ucok.edu/opsa/OPSR/
Journal%20Vol1-Number1/page7-12.pdf.
18. Kelly Edmiston (2004), “The Net Effects of Large Plant
Locations and Expansions on County Employment,” Journal of
Regional Science, vol. 44 (2), pp. 289–319.
19. Yoonsoo Lee (2004), “Geographic Redistribution of U.S.
Manufacturing and the Role of State Development Policy,” Working
Paper 04–15 (Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Decem-
ber), www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/2004/WP04-15.pdf.
20. Michael Greenstone and Enrico Moretti (2004), “Bidding for
Industrial Plants: Does Winning a ‘Million Dollar Plant’ Increase
Welfare?” MIT Working Paper Series 04–39, (Cambridge, Mass.:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November).
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information about incentives. Ten years ago, fewer
than half of states regularly published detailed reports
on their tax expenditures; but by 2006, according to
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, two-thirds
of states were regularly preparing such reports, with
most of them made available online.
State tax expenditure reports generally contain
information about budget outlays; some also contain
data speciﬁcally on incentives. The 2005–07 Oregon
tax expenditure report, for example, discusses the
state’s Strategic Investment Program. Under this
major incentive program, in place since 1993, ﬁrms
may qualify for a 15-year exemption from property
The Texas Local Economic Development Sales Taxes
In 1989, the Texas legislature amended existing state law
to allow cities meeting certain criteria to adopt a dedi-
cated sales tax to fund industrial development projects.
1
Follow-up legislation in 1991 allowed cities to adopt a
sales tax dedicated to quality-of-life improvements.These
two programs—known by their code designations as the
section 4A tax and the section 4B tax—are commonly
referred to as the Texas economic development sales
taxes. Cities in counties whose population is less than
500,000, and smaller cities in the six largest Texas
counties (Bexar, Dallas, El Paso, Harris, Tarrant, and
Travis), are eligible to levy the taxes.
The taxes may be imposed only if the citizens of a city
approve their use in a regular election; the taxes stay in
effect either for the period speciﬁed on the ballot or, if no
end date is speciﬁed, until they are repealed. Each of the
two taxes may be authorized in increments of one-eighth
of 1 percent, up to a maximum of 1⁄2 percent. A city may
have the two taxes in force simultaneously. However, the
combined rate of all local sales and use taxes, including
these special taxes, may not, under Texas law, exceed
2 percent. The uses for the two taxes, as deﬁned in the
state laws creating them, are as follows:
￿ Section 4A. To acquire or pay for land, buildings,
equipment, facilities, expenditures, targeted infrastruc-
ture and improvements for purposes related to manufac-
turing and industrial development.
￿ Section 4B. To undertake projects for quality-of-life
improvements that will attract and retain primary
employers. Money may be spent on land, buildings,
equipment, and facilities expenditures and improve-
ments for tourism, entertainment, recreation, athletic
facilities, and parks; affordable housing; and municipal
infrastructure.
Funds raised through a 4A tax are perhaps the clearest
example anywhere of a dedicated pool of funds that policy-
makers may use at their discretion to offer incentives.
Conversely, expenditures of funds raised through 4B taxes
are more representative of the type of public expenditures
for economic development desired by researchers and
policymakers who downplay the effectiveness of direct
business incentives. As of October 2007, of the more than
1,000 cities in Texas, the 4Atax was in place in 222, and the
4B tax was in place in 439. Because of the relatively high
rate of participation in the programs, Texas may be an ideal
case study for analyzing the effects of direct (4A) and
indirect (4B) economic development incentives.
Cities adopting one or both of the taxes are required to
establish a community corporation to administer the funds
raised. The practical difference between the 4A and 4B
taxes can be seen in the primary objectives of the commu-
nity corporations as well as in the distribution of their
spending (tables 1 and 2). According to the most recent
state report on these incentives (covering ﬁscal 2005), job
creation and job retention were the primary objectives in
nearly four out of ﬁve cities that had enacted a 4A tax,
compared with about half of the cities that had enacted a 4B
tax. Sports, recreation, and tourism development were
much more likely to be the focus of 4B cities. In ﬁscal
2005, about 24 percent of 4A tax revenues were spent on
direct business incentives (such as buildings and equipment
for businesses), compared with only 7 percent of 4B tax
revenues.Inaddition,almost60percentof4Arevenueswere
1. Objectives of economic development reported by





Job creation and job retention ...... 167 212
Infrastructure projects ............. 101 254
Sports facilities and recreation ..... 1 1 137
Tourism .......................... 14 125
Other ............................. 15 40
Number of cities .................. 21 1 413
NOTE: Respondents were asked to indicate their primary objective for
economic development but were allowed to identify more than one
primary objective.
1. For information about the Texas Economic Development Sales taxes,
see www.window.state.tx.us/taxinfo/taxpubs/tx96_302.html. Section 4A
and 4B program participation, by community, can be found at the Texas
Comptroller of Public Accounts website, at www.window.state.tx.us/
taxinfo/addit.html. City and county sales tax data used in this analysis came
from a Freedom of Information request to that office. New and expanding
investment records were provided by the state’s Business and Industry Data
Center through the Texas Office of the Governor, Department of Economic
Development and Tourism www.governor.state.tx.us/ecodev.
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of more than $100 million. This exemption has been
used by six large semiconductor-fabrication establish-
ments. The tradeoff for the state for the ﬁscal year
2005–07 biennium was $159 million in lost property
tax revenue versus a gain of $5.2 billion in continuing
investment, some $16 million in additional property
tax on related non-exempt investment, $24 million in
community service fees paid in lieu of property taxes,
and unknown additional jobs, payroll, and spin-off
effects. These ﬁgures provide policymakers with hard
data in evaluating the incentive’s efficacy.
Other groups are also making information on incen-
tives more widely available:
￿ The Council for Community and Economic Re-
spent on marketing and promotion, debt service, and
capital costs. Much of the spending on debt service and
capital costs is likely being used on land, the single most
prevalent capital asset reported by all 4A and 4B cities.
Ultimately, analyzing program data (data on the pres-
ence, duration, and size of the taxes) in combination with
general economic data (data on announced business
investments and growth in the tax base) provides informa-
tion on the effects of the taxes.Astarting point for such an
analysis would be to compare the growth of gross busi-
ness sales in adopting and non-adopting cities. The data
show that the average annual rate of growth of gross sales
was higher in cities that had 4A taxes in at least half the
years from 1992 to 2004 than in those that did not
(table 3). The same relationship held for 4B cities and
non-4B cities and for cities having both taxes and those
having neither; in all three data sets, the differences were
statistically signiﬁcant.
Another way of looking at program performance is to
compare the number of announced investments by new
and expanding businesses in cities that had and had not
adopted the section 4A tax. Table 4 shows that by 2003
some 20 percent of eligible Texas cities had adopted the
4A tax.
2 Those 4A cities accounted for more than 40 per-
cent of the announcements by new businesses—the ﬁrms
most likely to be affected by the presence of a develop-
ment incentive. Among 4A cities, the prevalence of new-
ﬁrm announcements was most pronounced in the cities that
had populations between 5,000 and 30,000. Speciﬁcally, the
86 4A cities with between 5,000 and 30,000 residents
accounted for 39.8 percent of all cities of this size and
54.2 percent of new-ﬁrm announcements. Among the cities
with more than 30,000 residents, the 4A cities’ shares were
30.5 percent of the total number of cities and 34.7 percent of
new-ﬁrm announcements.
3. Average annual growth of gross sales in cities with











With tax during period ......... 6.51 2.11 167
Without tax during period ...... 5.18 . . . 789
4B cities
With tax during period ......... 6.87 4.01 255
Without tax during period ...... 4.74 . . . 625
4A and 4B cities
With both taxes during period .. 8.80 2.88 48
With neither tax during period .. 4.58 . . . 503
All Texas cities .................. 5.48 . . . 1,012
NOTE: For cities without the tax(es), includes cities that did not have
the tax during the entire period 1992–2004. For cities with the tax(es), in-
cludes only those cities that had the tax(es) for at least six years during
the period 1992–2004. Excludes cities having either no population or no
reported business sales in either 1992 or 2004.
2. Distribution of expenditures of 4A and 4B funds by community development corporations, by type of expense and








Dollars Percent Dollars Percent Dollars Percent
Direct business incentives ...... 80,397,570 14.6 59,118,504 24.4 21,279,066 6.9
Marketing and promotion ...... 10,054,118 1.8 6,107,685 2.5 3,946,433 1.3
Debt service ................... 1 12,558,737 20.4 38,292,808 15.8 74,265,929 24.1
Capital costs ................... 221,698,352 40.2 97,206,877 40.1 124,491,475 40.4
Personnel ...................... 25,879,928 4.7 12,725,439 5.2 13,154,489 4.3
Administration ................. 25,727,296 4.7 13,788,975 5.7 11,938,321 3.9
Affordable housing ............. 2,429,992 .4 3,260 .0 2,426,732 .8
Payments to taxing units ....... 31,264,632 5.7 4,520,531 1.9 26,744,101 8.7
Job training ................... 1,771,460 .3 393,192 .2 1,378,268 .4
Other ......................... 39,106,266 7.1 10,384,887 4.3 28,721,379 9.3
Total .......................... 550,888,351 100.0 242,542,158 100.0 308,346,193 100.0
NOTE: Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.
2. Developing an incentive takes some time. For this reason, cities in
this analysis were accorded 4A status in the third year after they voted to
enact the tax.
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tory of state incentives that contains more than
1,500 records on distinct programs, many with
contact information.Although this data set does not
currently contain measures of the effects of incen-
tive programs, the descriptions, some including
citations of enabling legislation, are quite detailed.
Policymakers can use the directory to compare
incentive programs across states.
￿ The Census Bureau’s Local Employment Dynam-
ics database contains longitudinal data, by indus-
try, on the formation, growth, and decline of es-
tablishments, as well as employee hirings and
separations.
￿ The Census Bureau’sAmerican Community Survey
(a new nationwide survey that will be an element of
future censuses) will allow researchers to look at
areas as small in size as a census tract and thereby
improve researchers’ ability to examine the effects
of site-speciﬁc incentives.
￿ An increasing number of jurisdictions make avail-
able to the public tax data on real estate parcels.
These databases provide such information as the
market value of land and equipment—information
that helps researchers examine business activity
related to incentives.
￿ Good Jobs First (GJF), a national policy resource
center promoting corporate and government ac-
countability in economic development, has been
instrumental in making incentive programs more
transparent to the public. Spurred at least by lobby-
ing by GJF state affiliates, a dozen states now
disclose information about incentives provided to
speciﬁc companies. The GJF website tracks legisla-
tion relating to disclosure laws and offers model
text for state and local governments. GJF also
The analysis of the effects of the Texas economic
development sales taxes is extremely preliminary, and
many questions remain unanswered. For example, what
other factors (such as the presence of other incentives)
could inﬂuence the ﬁnding that incentives made possible
by the special sales taxes are increasing business invest-
ment? Furthermore, growth of gross sales and announce-
ments of business investment are not the only ways to
measure results. What other data, such as data on employ-
ment growth or property tax revenues, could be used as
proxies for the effects of the taxes? And ﬁnally, if further
studies conﬁrm that the Texas economic development sales
taxes are effective tools for stimulating local economies,
can the relative effect of 4Aand 4B spending in each major
category—marketing and promotion, direct business incen-
tives, or capital costs—be determined?
4. Distribution of announcements of large business investments in cities eligible to adopt the 4A tax, 1989 to 2003
City population and status
Eligible cities Announcements of new investment Announcements of expansions
Number Percent of total Number Percent Number Percent
Under 1,000
W ithtax ......................... 27 5.7 2 40.0 6 54.5
Without tax ...................... 445 94.3 3 60.0 5 45.5
Total ............................... 472 100.0 5 100.0 11 100.0
1,000 to 4,999
W ithtax ......................... 107 24.5 11 29.7 14 40.0
Without tax ...................... 330 75.5 26 70.3 21 60.0
Total ............................... 437 100.0 37 100.0 35 100.0
5,000 to 14,999
W ith4Atax...................... 65 40.9 57 60.0 40 48.8
Without tax ...................... 94 59.1 38 40.0 42 51.2
Total ............................... 159 100.0 95 100.0 82 100.0
15,000 to 29,999
W ithtax ......................... 21 36.8 47 48.5 41 34.7
Without tax ...................... 36 63.2 50 51.5 77 65.3
Total ............................... 57 100.0 97 100.0 118 100.0
30,000 and above
W ithtax ......................... 18 30.5 126 34.7 116 29.8
Without tax ...................... 41 69.5 237 65.3 273 70.2
Total ............................... 59 100.0 363 100.0 389 100.0
All eligible cities
W ithtax ......................... 238 20.1 243 40.7 217 34.2
Without tax ...................... 946 79.9 354 59.3 418 65.8
Percent in 4A cities ................. 1,184 100.0 597 100.0 635 100.0
NOTE: For this table, cities were considered to have a 4A tax three years after enacting the tax. Large investments are investments worth more than
$100,000 or adding more than 100 jobs.
A68 Federal Reserve Bulletin h October 2008publishes reports on accountable development, that
is, development programs that are transparent and
include standards for evaluating the effectiveness of
incentives.
Current Thinking on Incentives
The use of reﬁned approaches and better data sets has
improved researchers’ ability to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of speciﬁc incentive programs. But funda-
mental concerns remain, and some researchers have
begun to write off economic development incentives
as ineffective or inefficient for a host of reasons.
Several arguments underlie their conclusions:
￿ Themagnitudeofanyeconomicdevelopmentincen-
tive is generally too small to have a more-than-
marginal inﬂuence on the behavior of the typical
new, relocating, or expanding ﬁrm. As a result,
public resources ﬂow to ﬁrms that do not produce
any economic beneﬁts for the area.
￿ Incentives are distortionary, that is, they misallocate
private resources by leading ﬁrms to move to or
expand in suboptimal places.
￿ Incentives crowd out government spending on pub-
lic goods.
￿ The provision of incentives is a zero-sum game:
gains in any one location will be offset by losses in
other locations.
These arguments are not without their shortcom-
ings, as the following discussion demonstrates.
“Incentives Are Too Small to Matter”
Fisher and Peters put forward the “too small to
matter” argument in their 2004 paper “The Failures of
Economic Development Incentives.”21 In their analy-
sis, they began by assuming that (1) an incentive that
reduces a ﬁrm’s state and local taxes will have a
statistically signiﬁcant effect on that ﬁrm’s economic
activity and (2) this effect is represented by an
elasticity of –0.3 (the “consensus” elasticity put for-
ward by Bartik), meaning that a 10 percent tax cut for
businesses will produce a 3 percent increase in invest-
ment or jobs by ﬁrms eligible for the tax cut. Apply-
ing this elasticity ratio to their research, Fisher and
Peters concluded that the incentives they analyzed
were responsible for only about one in ten new jobs
added in the enterprise zones: “Thus the best case is
that incentives work about 10 percent of the time, and
are simply a waste of money the other 90 percent.”22
They calculated that each incentive-induced job in an
enterprise zone had a cost of some $42,000 over 20
years, and argued that even though the incentives did
create jobs, the cost threw doubt on the incentives’
effectiveness. Of course, this conclusion is based on a
“consensus” elasticity of –0.3. If the actual elasticity
were twice as large (–0.6), the success rate would be
doubled, meaning that the incentives would generate
20 percent of the new jobs in the enterprise zones and
could be revenue enhancing (under the reasonable
assumption that the incentive-induced jobs generate
$21,000 in tax revenue over 20 years, or slightly more
than $1,000 a year).
Is it possible to design an incentive that is twice as
successful as the across-the-board enterprise-zone tax
cuts Fisher and Peters analyzed? Proponents argue
that incentives can be made more effective by target-
ing them to the needs of a particular region or set of
ﬁrms rather than applying them broadly to a large
region or a wide range of businesses. One aspect of
targeting is designing an incentive in such a way as to
exclude from the program those ﬁrms that would
invest in the region even if they did not receive the
incentive. If a large enough number of such ﬁrms can
be excluded, the effectiveness of that incentive can be
improved. A second aspect of targeting is specifying
qualiﬁcation requirements so as to reduce the possi-
bility of extending the incentive to ﬁrms that are not
likely to change their behavior even if they do receive
it. Dauffenbach and Warner and Gorin studied an
incentive program with such a qualiﬁcation require-
ment: recipients of the wage subsidy provided under
Oklahoma’s Quality Jobs program were required to
create at least 100 new jobs, making the incentive
more restrictive than other incentive programs in the
state.23 Both sets of researchers concluded that the
targeted program was as much as 50 percent effective,
that is, for every ten jobs created, ﬁve were induced
by the subsidy. While the conclusions were not the
statistically signiﬁcant result of rigorously designed
studies, the ﬁndings do merit consideration—and
further study.
Although targeted incentives—such as those pro-
vided under Oklahoma’s Quality Jobs program—may
be more effective, targeting does raise the “but-for”
question, as well as questions about fairness. To be
efficient as well as effective, incentives must be
21. Peter Fisher andAlan Peters (2004), “The Failures of Economic
Development Incentives,” Journal of the American Planning Associa-
tion, vol. 70, pp. 27–38 (Winter), http://local.law.umn.edu/uploads/
images/2222/PetersFisherFailureofEconomicIncentives.pdf.
22. Fisher and Peters, “The Failures of Economic Development
Incentives,” p. 32.
23. Dauffenbach and Warner (2004), “Oklahoma’sAd Valorem Tax
Exemptions and the Quality Jobs Act”; and Gorin, “State Economic
Growth Incentives and the Oklahoma Quality Jobs Program.”
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will not be affected by the presence of the incentive.
Can governments differentiate ﬁrms whose decisions
about growth are likely to be affected by incentives
(that is, businesses that would not locate or expand in
a region “but for” the incentive) from ﬁrms whose
decisions do not depend on inducements? And would
governments be willing to run the political risk of
offering incentives to some ﬁrms but not others (or to
offer different incentives to different ﬁrms)? Or would
the practice of targeting incentives be viewed as
inequitable? Gorin looked at both matters in connec-
tion with the Oklahoma Quality Jobs program. In a
survey of participating ﬁrms, he found that the incen-
tive was nearly twice as important in securing the
location or expansion of ﬁrms planning to add at least
100 new jobs as it was in securing the location or
expansion of ﬁrms expecting to add fewer than 100
Overcoming State-Tax-Related Market Distortions by Providing Local Incentives
Distortions Related to Corporate Income Tax
Apportionment Formulas
Firms that produce and sell goods or services in more
than one state generally are liable, in each of those states,
for taxes on some portion of their corporate proﬁts. Many
states determine the proportion of a ﬁrm’s proﬁts subject
to state taxation on the basis of three equally weighted
factors: the percentage of the ﬁrm’s (1) property located
in the state, (2) sales made to residents of the state, and
(3) payroll paid to residents of the state. Uniform applica-
tion of this formula across the states would result in the
states, collectively, taxing all of a ﬁrm’s proﬁt exactly
once, and only once. Some states, however, emphasize
the sales factor in their formula by making it twice as
important as the other two factors, or double-weighting it.
And a few states take the so-called single-sales-factor
approach, basing the proportion of proﬁts subject to state
taxation solely on the percentage of sales in the state.
Emphasizing the sales factor may increase a state’s
attractiveness as a place for corporate expansion, but such
an approach results in market distortions compared with
situations where the once-standard three-factor approach
are employed.
Emphasis on the sales factor magniﬁes the problem of
“nowhere income”—income that ends up not being taxed
because a corporation has so little activity in a state to
which a sale is allocated. In such case, a “nexus” does not
exist and, therefore, the state does not have the authority
to tax the corporation. Some states have enacted a “throw-
back rule,” under which proﬁts from out-of-state sales—
proﬁts that are not taxed by other states—are re-allocated to
the enacting state.
Such tax code differences among states play into deci-
sions by businesses planning new facilities and operations.
Suppose, for example, that a ﬁrm planning to build two
identical facilities tries to decide whether to locate both
facilities in state A, both in state B, or one facility in each
state. Assume that the ﬁrm knows that it will sell 5 percent
of its output in each state and 90 percent in the rest of the
country, and that both states tax corporate income at
6 percent of proﬁts. State A will double-weight sales, while
state B weights sales at 100 percent. State B does not have a
throwback rule. Table 1 shows the ﬁrm’s potential tax
liability under several scenarios, assuming annual proﬁts of
$100 million.
Locating both facilities in state B would save either
$5.7 million or $2.85 million more than locating both in
state A, depending upon whether state A has a throwback
rule. Locating one facility in each state would result in a tax
liability either 20 or 5.5 times higher in stateAthan in state
B. Thus, the ﬁrm might locate in state B—regardless of the
1. State tax liability for a hypothetical ﬁrm, under different scenarios




To state A To state B
Both facilities in state A
With throwback rule ...................... 6,000,000 0 All proﬁts revert to state A
Without throwback rule ................... 3,150,000 0 52.5% of proﬁts are assigned to state; the remainder are
unassigned
Both facilities in state B .................... 0 300,000 5% of proﬁts are assigned to state B; the remainder are
unassigned
One facility in each state
State A with throwback rule ............... 3,000,000 150,000 50% of proﬁts revert back to state A
Neither state with throwback rule .......... 825,000 150,000 State A accepts 27.5% of its proﬁt; state B, 5%
A70 Federal Reserve Bulletin h October 2008jobs.24 This ﬁnding suggests that by specifying a
readily identiﬁable criterion—number of new jobs to
be added—the state was able to effectively limit
participation in the incentive program. In other words,
the survey data suggest that the state should be able to
target the incentive. The question of political will was
a different matter. Gorin noted that political consider-
ations prompted the issuance of numerous regulatory
proposals that would have weakened the targeting by
reducing the threshold for program participation from
100 new jobs to a much lower number.
“Incentives Result in Misallocation of
Private Resources”
Economic development incentives are intended to
induce capital investment in a jurisdiction in which
such investment might not otherwise take place.
Opponents of incentives argue that such inducements
24. Gorin, “State Economic Growth Incentives and the Oklahoma
Quality Jobs Program.”
difference in its operating costs in that state relative to its
costs in state A—resulting in an inefficient allocation of
resources.
StateAcould, to make itself a more attractive location,
adopt the same apportionment formula and rules as state
B, a strategy that could allow the ﬁrm to allocate its
resources more efficiently; however, such a change could
radically affect many additional ﬁrms in state A. Alterna-
tively, state A might choose to use targeted incentives to
overcome the distortions resulting from these differences
in state tax code structures.
1
Distortions Resulting from Application of the
Freeport Exemption
The tax codes of most states include a “freeport exemp-
tion,” which exempts from inventory tax or property tax
all property that is in the state for the purpose of being
assembled into other products (raw materials, for ex-
ample) or for distribution (such as ﬁnished goods), pro-
vided that the property comes into the state and leaves the
state within a short period (typically three or nine
months). In practical terms, the exemption means that
inventory in warehouses located in a state also serving as
the “point of sale” generally is subject to property taxes.
Thus, the freeport exemption can distort ﬁrms’ decision-
making by creating a preference to locate a warehouse or
distribution center some distance from the intended mar-
ket, speciﬁcally, in a location across a state border. The
results of such a distortion can be seen in the proliferation
of warehouses and distribution centers in Oklahoma, just
north of the Oklahoma−Texas border, to serve markets
around Dallas.
Suppose that a ﬁrm planning to build a warehouse to serve
the Dallas area market is trying to decide whether to locate
in Oklahoma or Texas. It will import its entire product from
outside both states and will sell 10 percent of the product in
Oklahoma and 90 percent in Texas. The effective property
tax rate is 1.1 percent in Oklahoma and 2.85 percent in
Texas.
2 Property tax liability on inventory is calculated as:
Inventory on hand × Share of inventory not eligible
for freeport exemption × Effective property tax rate.
Table 2 shows that, with an average inventory valued at
$100 million, the ﬁrm would save almost $2.5 million
annually in taxes by locating in Oklahoma—possibly more
than it could save in shipping costs by locating the ware-
house in the Dallas area, close to its major market.
3 Should
a community in the Dallas area offer the ﬁrm an incentive—
perhaps a partial property tax abatement—to locate closer
to Dallas, the incentive could well overcome the misalloca-
tion of resources resulting from application of the freeport
exemption.
2. The Oklahoma rate in this example is the average for Ardmore and
Marietta, the two largest Oklahoma communities on Interstate 35, just north
of the Oklahoma–Texas border (data from the Oklahoma Department of
Commerce community proﬁles). The Texas rate is the average of ﬁve
communities: Denton and Gainesville (two cities on Interstate 35 just south
of the Oklahoma–Texas border); Dallas; and two Dallas suburbs, Plano and
Carrolton (data from community websites).
3. The estimated annual property tax in Texas would be $100,000,000 ×
90% × 2.85%, or $2,565,000, compared with $100,000,000 × 10% × 1.1%,
or $110,000 in Oklahoma.
1. Michael Mazerov notes that at least eleven states estimated revenue
loss attributable to adopting a sales-only formula. This loss of corporate
income tax revenue was estimated to be above $100 million in California,
Massachusetts, and New York. See Michael Mazerov (2005), “The ‘Single
Sales Factor’ Formula for State Corporate Taxes: A Boon to Economic
Development or a Costly Giveaway?,” Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities report, rev. September 1, www.cbpp.org/3-27-01sfp.htm. Smaller
businesses that do not beneﬁt from the change to a sales-only formula
(because all of their sales are in-state) might even fare worse if their taxes
are raised to compensate for the state tax revenue lost because of the
change.
2. Property tax liability for a hypothetical ﬁrm, under
different scenarios














100,000,000 ............... 10 1.10 110,000
Texas location
100,000,000 ............... 90 2.85 2,565,000
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cause incentives cause capital to locate in a subopti-
mal location, one in which the market would not
naturally place the investment. Opponents further
argue that this incentive-induced distortion has a
negative effect on other ﬁrms in the same jurisdiction
(such as higher costs for purchased inputs, as dis-
cussed by Alwang, Peterson, and Mills25).
However, not all incentives distort the allocation
of private resources. In fact, they can be used to
offset distortions resulting from differences in tax
bases across jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions may
rely primarily on personal income as a basis for
taxation, for example, while others may rely on
personal property or retail sales. Two examples (see
the box “Overcoming State-Tax-Related Market Dis-
tortions by Providing Local Incentives”) illustrate
how variations in regional tax structures can result
in the misallocation of resources and how such
distortions might be overcome through carefully
designed incentives. These examples, representing
actual situations faced by ﬁrms and jurisdictions
(though the numbers used are hypothetical), suggest
that more research is needed to determine the extent
to which incentives actually distort the allocation of
private resources.
“Incentives Given to Private Entities Crowd
Out Public Spending”
Some critics argue that spending on incentives crowds
out spending on public goods and services, such as
education and transportation. Burstein and Rolnick,
for example, write that “[w]hen competition takes the
form of preferential treatment for speciﬁc businesses,
it misallocates private resources and causes state and
local governments to provide too few public goods.”26
Fisher and Peters have echoed this sentiment, and
proposed that economic development incentives be
discontinued in favor of spending on infrastructure
and education.27 However, quantifying the effects of
spending on infrastructure and education may be just
as difficult as quantifying the effects of spending on
development incentives. And the presence of exter-
nalities associated with ﬁrm location (such as lower
social safety net costs and higher property values
resulting from a more robust economy) can make
spending on incentives as appropriate for a govern-
ment as spending on traditional public goods.
Bartik recommends that governments focus on
productivity-enhancing incentives—such as job train-
ing and helping resident entrepreneurs prepare busi-
ness plans—so that beneﬁts might last longer.28 Eco-
nomic development initiatives can also be used to
accomplish public objectives, and even save on costs,
without explicitly spending public dollars. Maine’s
Progressive Alliance for Careers and Training pro-
gram, for instance—a well-regarded effort targeted at
building up small manufacturing, health care, and
information technology industries in economically
depressed areas of the state—tied ﬁnancial assistance
for participating ﬁrms to their hiring of newly trained
and dislocated workers. Other incentives that have a
public purpose include the zoning incentives offered
by some jurisdictions in the Washington, D.C. metro-
politan area. These incentives give developers the
right to build extra units of residential housing on
ﬁxed parcels of land if the developer sets aside a
certain percentage of the units for affordable housing.
Contrary to the criticism that incentives necessarily
crowd out the spending of limited public resources
for public purposes, these examples show that incen-
tives can induce the private sector to allocate re-
sources for a public purpose.
“Incentives Are a Zero-Sum Proposition”
Critics of incentives often invoke the “zero-sum”
argument, asserting that one locality’s gain in jobs or
other beneﬁts is another locality’s loss. Supporters
counter that even if incentives simply move jobs from
one place to another and spur no additional economic
activity, they can still be beneﬁcial overall. How is it
possible that the same business investment can raise
overall social welfare more in one place than another?
Such a situation can arise if one community values
the jobs and investment more than another.
Communities’ respective valuations of an oppor-
tunity for a new or expanded business can differ for
a variety of reasons: economic objectives (such as
higher employment rates and improved workforce
skills), community goals (such as growth), and views
regarding externalities (for example, town A might
be more inclined to have a prison or casino than
town B, and city B might be more willing to accept
additional noise or other adverse side effects than
city A). One measure of this differing valuation or
25. Alwang, Peterson, and Mills, “Assessing the Impacts of Incen-
tives to Attract New Businesses.”
26. Melvin L. Burstein and Arthur J. Rolnick (1996), “Congress
Should End the Economic War for Sports and Other Businesses”
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, fedgazette (January),
www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/fedgaz/96-01/opinion.cfm.
27. Fisher and Peters, “Tax and Spending Incentives and Enterprise
Zones.”
28. Bartik, “Who Beneﬁts from State and Local Economic Devel-
opment Policies?”
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has as its proxy the size of the incentive package
being offered by agents for a community. In some
cases, these agents may act, at least in part, on their
own preferences or perceptions about community
wishes. In other cases, community preferences are
affirmed explicitly through the democratic process
when the public has the chance to vote on general
or speciﬁc incentive packages. Community prefer-
ence for a project may even be conﬁrmed or dis-
proved after the fact by citizen response to employ-
ment opportunities.
THE DISCUSSION GOING FORWARD
The composition of economic development incen-
tives may evolve over time in response to business
and community needs and public concerns, but incen-
tives will undoubtedly remain a tool used by policy-
makers to stimulate local and state economic devel-
opment. Good public policy requires that the details
of incentive packages be disclosed and that the effec-
tiveness of incentives be measured. Policymakers can
then be held accountable for their decisions on the
basis of evidence rather than politics. New databases
allowing more-accurate analysis are becoming avail-
able, and new data sources are beginning to make
public the details of incentive packages. The research
described in this article shows the ways in which data
and methods have improved over the past ten years.
Furthermore, the studies suggest that incentives can
be effective in certain situations, and also buttress the
case for further research that makes use of the new
data and investigative tools.
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